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85
DIALOGUE
Whither
Systematic Theology?
A
Systematician
Chimes in on a Scandalous Conversation
Amos
Yong
What is systematic theology? How is it to be done? How is it best taught?
Is
systematic theology
a viable
discipline heading
into the twenty-first century,
or is it an outmoded remnant of the modem ratio- nalistic mind? These and other related
questions
have taken on a new urgency
for
theologians
in
light
of the
responses
elicited
by
Mark Noll’s
book,
The Scandal
of the Evangelical
Mind.! As a
systematic theologian,
I am concerned that some of the remarks of James K. A.
Smith and
Cheryl Bridges
Johns
may
be used as fuel for the fire
against sturdy theological
work
by
those who are not well
disposed
to the dis- cipline
of
theology
or to
systematic theological
reflection to
begin with.2 Given that the editors of PNEUMA have
presented
Smith’s arti- cle as an invitation to dialogue, herewith follows the
musings
of a
sys- tematician in the
hopes
that it will not
only
add
something
of substance to the conversation, but also that it will
encourage
Pentecostals in
gen- eral and
theologians
in
particular
to reflect further both on how their craft relates to other
disciplines
in the
academy
and on its
place
in the life of the Church.
Let me
say up
front that there is much in the
responses
of Smith and Johns with which I
agree, especially
in their defense of the
Wesleyan and Pentecostal traditions
against
Noll’s
charges. ,
Noll’s
thesis,
of
I Mark Noll, The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., and Leicester, England: InterVarsity Press, 1994).
2James K. A. Smith, “Scandalizing Theology: A Pentecostal Response to Noll’s Scandal,” PNEUMA: The Journal of the Society for
Pentecostal Studies 19
“Partners
(fall 1997): 225-38;
and
Cheryl Bridges
Johns, in Scandal: Wesleyan and Pentecostal Scholarship,” presented to the 27th Annual Meeting of the Society for Pentecostal Theology, Cleveland, Tennessee, 12-14 March 1998, in the second of a two-volume set of conference papers.
1
86
course,
is that “the scandal of the
evangelical
mind is that there is not much of an evangelical mind.”3 He submits that
liability
for this unfor- tunate
development
can be traced to the
patterns
of
thinking
fostered within
evangelicalism by dispensational,
Holiness and Pentecostal the- ologies.4
Whereas Smith’s
response
is to agree in large
part
with Noll’s argument only
to point out that Noll has missed the mark
regarding
the broader issue of
mistakenly intellectualizing theology,
Johns reinter- prets
the scandal
by contending
that Pentecostal
glossolalia
is at least in part a subversion of
language
and that the movement is a harbinger of
postmodernism,
a protest from the
margins against totalizing
meta- narratives of which Noll’s ideal
evangelical
mind is but one historical- ly
conditioned form. Both Smith and Johns are correct in what
they affirm. There are, however, some
implications
to their
strategies
which I wish
they
would have addressed. These are related
fundamentally
to their
conception
of
theology
as an academic
discipline
and its role in the future of Pentecostalism.
Smith
questions
Noll’s model of
integration
which does not dis- tinguish
between faith as a pretheoretical experience and
theology
as a theoretical
discipline.5
Because of this
failure,
Noll falls into the
trap of
supposing
that
theology
as a theoretical
discipline
can and should function as an
integrating
one for other fields of theoretical
knowledge. Smith
disagrees
and
suggests
instead a Pentecostal model of
integra- tion that is based on
praxis
as derived from a pretheoretical experience (faith).
This
praxis
model he traces in
part
to the class locations of early
Pentecostalism.
There is much to
applaud
in Smith’s overall
analysis. My uneasiness with his
response
to Noll is not so much in what he
says,
but in what can be inferred from what he
says.
His
labeling
of Noll’s
pro- ject
as
“bourgeois”
in that there is leisure for
reading
and
study
rather than an existence devoted to survival, his
acceptance
of the Pentecostal
3Noll, Scandal, 3.
4Ultimately, however, Noll’s convenient whipping boys turn out to be the Scottish Common-Sense of the 18th and 19th centuries which
the fundamentalist
philosophy
mind (see chapter four of Noll, Scandal).
undergirded the of
emergence
He does note, however, that such may be a less than accurate
in
reading of a complex set of his- torical relationships
light of more recent arguments (p. 87, n. 8) what is now known as Reformed propounded by
epistemology.
I mention this point in passing to highlight
the difficulty of historical arguments, a difficulty which Noll him- self as a first-rate historian making should, but fails at times to, recognize in this book.
SThis failure on Noll’s part is all the more surprising since the distinction between faith and theology has become a virtually accepted methodological datum in the aca- demic discipline of religious studies since Wilfred Cantwell Smith introduced a rede- finition of religion as (subjective) faith and (objective) historical traditions in the early
1960s (cf. his The Meaning and End of Religion [ 1962; reprint, Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1991]).
‘
2
87
tradition as one that has delimited and relativized
theology
and other academic
disciplines
“in the name of social
justice,”
his
pointing
out that theoretical work for Pentecostals is less
important
than
“feeding the
hungry
and
clothing
the naked”—all leave the reader with the false impression
that Smith
approves
of these Pentecostal
emphases
even if they
have led us to
neglect
the life of the mind.6
Further,
while I
agree
with Smith that
theology
is a second- order
activity
of the mind as it reflects on the data of
faith-experience, I wonder if faith itself can be construed as
entirely pretheoretical. Human
beings
are never
only “pretheoretical,”
but
through
and
through thinking
animals. Is not faith a much more
complex integration
of imagination, interpretation, theory
and the
pursuit
of
responsibility
in the
experiential process?7
The delimitation of faith to
pretheoretical experience,
while
helpful
on one level
(the methodological),
is ulti- mately
in itself an abstraction that is less
helpful
on other levels
(i.e., the
experiential
or
theological).
I will not
pursue
this issue here since it is not the burden of this article. Instead, I want to accentuate
my agreements
with Smith’s work rather than
harp
over
speculative
details in the
“bourgeois”
realm of
cognitive theory.
More
damaging,
it seems to
me,
is the
possibility
that
leaving faith in the realm of the
pretheoretical
alone
may
do
precisely
what Smith himself would abhor:
perpetuate
a less than
clearly
defined dis- tinction between faith and
thought.
This dualism has been in part at the core of the
century-long
anti-intellectualist Pentecostal attitude. Smith does not
say
much about
theology except
that it is a theoretical disci- pline
that flows from our
pretheoretical
faith
experiences (our
world- view).
I wish he would have said more since those
remaining
anti- intellectualists
among
us would continue to ride his clear-cut distinc- tion to
argue
for the
priority
of Pentecostal faith to the
neglect
of Pentecostal
thinking.
With this
strategy,
Pentecostal
theology would
6Smith, “Scandalizing Theology,” 237-38. I say “false impression” since Smith’s work demonstrates a Pentecostal commitment to the life of the mind. As a theologian interested in philosophy, I have followed Smith’s work from afar and appreciate many of the conversations into which he is bringing Pentecostal scholars.
7My
own formulation derives from Robert Neville’s theory of cognition as devel-
in his Axiology of Thinking trilogy: Reconstruction of Thinking (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1981),
oped
the Measure:
and Nature (Albany, NY: State of New York Recovery of
Interpretation
University Press, 1989), and Normative Cultures (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995). Neville’s cate- gories
are paralleled by Bernard Lonergan in his delineation of human understanding as a fourfold process of attention to experience, understanding, judgment, and valua- tional commitment and responsible praxis (cf. Lonergan’s Insight [New York, NY: Longmans, 1958]).
Cf. also
my (hopefully forthcoming)
“The Demise of Foundationalism and the Retention of Truth: What Evangelicals Can Learn from C. S. Peirce.”
3
88
continue to
play
second fiddle at best to Pentecostal
praxis,
and
many would remain
entirely happy
with that.8
Theology
is
already
a disci- pline
that is under attack on
many
fronts. Pentecostals need more rea- sons to be devoted to
theology
than additional
(even
if
misconstrued) reasons not to bother themselves with it.
The
prospects
for Pentecostal
theology may
not fare much better in the
light
of Cheryl Johns’ paper. Like Smith, she also notes that under- standing
the Pentecostal mind
requires
a
comprehension
of its social location. Johns
appropriates
the deconstructionist
critique
of Enlightenment rationality
and
argues
that one of the hallmarks of
post- modernism is the
emergence
of voices from the
margins.
She
urges that we now “have the
opportunity
to allow the minds scandalized
by Noll to
speak
for themselves on their own terms.”9 Whereas Noll would
interpret
the Holiness movement’s
motto,
“let
go
and let
God,” as an
ideological flight
from intellectual
responsibility,
Johns
argues that the demise of Cartesian foundationalism means that “the scandal of letting go and
letting
God is the most
intellectually respectable posi- tion available,” and that the deconstructed self is most amenable to what Pentecostals term the
“infilling
of the
Spirit.”10
In our
time, Johns hints that the scandal
may
well be the
Enlightenment
mind advo- cated somewhat
by
Noll rather than the heretofore
I
marginalized protests of Wesleyans
and Pentecostals.
Again,
I think that I am
largely
in agreement with
Johns,
both in her overall
position
as well as in her
argument against
Noll. But
again, what concerns me as a theologian is what is left unsaid. In her
case,
I am concerned not so much with how she
may
be
coopted by
those opposed
to Pentecostal
theologizing
as much as I am with the
implica- tions of her
paper
for the
discipline
of
systematic theology. Granted, Johns’ limited
objective
is an
apologetic
directed
against evangelical domination as defined
by
Noll and
company, yet
her
strategy
can
very easily
backfire if used
by theologians, especially
those
doing
work in constructive
systematic theology.
81t still amazes me that there are colleges and universities (which I will leave unnamed)
affiliated with different sectors of the Pentecostal movement that do not place
even a moderate premium on the discipline of theology; their raison d’etre is their commitment to ministry and Pentecostal praxis.
9Johns, “Partners in Scandal,” 10.
‘
lOJohns,
“Partners in Scandal,” 13-17; quote from p. 13.
11I say “somewhat” because while classical Protestantism plays a central role in what Noll considers to be the renaissance of the evangelical mind, there are other players
whose contributions Noll does not discount, and whose dialogue Noll values as that which will strengthen evangelical thinking. His emerging evangelical mind may
be even more of a welter of pluralities than he is conscious of; it is clearly more than his charting of its genealogy lets on.
4
89
The issue at stake
theologically
is that which has been raised
by
the appearance
of anti-theologians like Mark
Taylor.
Johns utilizes his and the work of other deconstructionists in her
paper
to
explore
what she calls the via
negativa
of Pentecostalism-its
dismantling
of the
pre- suppositions
of
modernity
and its subversion of
language. However, she avoids the issue at the heart of deconstructionism,
namely
its radi- cal
rejection
of all forms of metanarratives because of their
inherently totalizing
character. In the
place
of these
large-scale ideologies,
decon- structionists advocate the
interplay
of
multiple
narratives and voices. Johns
approves
of this move as one that
legitimates
the contributions of Wesleyans
and Pentecostals. But as a theologian, I am led to ask if at least
systematic theology
is now
dispensable?
The
question
here involves at least in part an understanding of what systematic theology
is. Johns nowhere defines it as it is not her imme- diate concern. But
traditionally,
at
least, systematic theology
has been understood as the deliberate
organization
of ideas
integrating
biblical revelation on God, self, and world that aims at universal truth. Anti- theologians immediately cry
“Foul!” because of their belief in the his- torical conditionedness of all
knowledge. By implication,
Johns would seem to
agree.
Yet she also knows that deconstruction is succeeded
by reconstruction. 12 I could
argue
in defense of this reconstructive
phase that biblical faith
provides
a metanarrative for
systematic
reflection that is not
totalizing,
or that
systematization
as
large-scale
fallibilistic hypotheses
does not
necessarily
entail
totality.l3
But I will for the moment assume Johns’
premises
and
pursue
instead what is undeter- mined
by
her: how should
theology proceed
now that no master narra- tives or
systems
remain viable after the
postmodemist critique?
What is the future of
systematic theology?
Several
strategies
have been
pursued.
One is the
acceptance
of
plu- ralism as intrinsic to the divine order of things. Those in this
theological
1 2Thus her mention of the “reconstructed self’ (“Partners in Scandal,” 17); cf. also her previous illuminating study of character formation, Pentecostal Formation: A Pedagogy Among
the
Oppressed (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993).
l3por elements of the former response, see J. Richard Middleton and Brian J. Walsh, Truth Is Stranger
Than It Used to Be: Biblical Faith in a Postmodern
Age (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995), and Lamin Sanneh, Encountering the West.
Christianity
and the Global Cultural Process: The African Dimension (Maryknoll,
NY: Orbis Books, 1993), especially his intriguing argument against lib- eral interpretations of Western missionary movements that biblical translation
fuel resistance to colonialism cultures rather than
pro- jects actually
latter
by indigenous subju- gating
them. For elements of the
response, see Robert Neville, The
Around Modernism (Albany, NY: State
Cummings
Highroad University of New York Press, 1992), esp.
111-160.
5
90
camp point
to the
plurality
that exists in the
scriptural
canon itself as evidence of this fact. Yet even here, there is an
ongoing struggle between
theologians
and biblical scholars. The former continue to press
the latter for critical norms
by
which to judge theological reflec- tion ;
the
latter,
even if
they agreed
that such norms are
necessary,
are either reluctant to admit that such norms can be determined
by
histori- cally
conditioned documents, or are divided as to what these norms may
be. Yet the issue of critical norms cannot be so
easily dismissed, if for no other reason than that
marginalized
voices are
imperiled
in the long
run since there are few other means
by
which
ideological
domi- nation can be resisted.
In an effort to
identify
that which is not
contingent
in the
scriptur- al message, biblical
theologians
such as Chris Beker have
attempted
to relocate what he calls the coherence of
Scripture away
from
proposi- tions and toward the
symbolic
and
metaphoric
structure
(in
his
argu- ment,
the
apocalyptic
worldview)
that underlies
Scripture (in
his
case, the Pauline
epistles).14
This dovetails
nicely
with Smith’s distinction between
pretheoretical
worldviews and theoretical constructs with the difference
being
that Smith
recognizes
the
historicity
of all worldviews while Beker’s
objective
is to argue for the universal relevance of Paul’s apocalyptic
framework as
allowing
access to and
appropriation
of his contingently
formulated
message.
While biblical scholars are
agreed as to his view of the
pervasiveness
of
apocalyptic
in the New Testament, they
are less convinced of the
way
in which Beker
applies this
theologically. Furthermore, theologians
are even more uncomfort- able with the
ambiguity
of Beker’s formulation. Much more
manage- able are more definitive norms such as that of “Christ and the cross as the criterion of all relevance and truth.”1S Without more
perspicuity, there is a danger of
lapsing
into
subjectivism.
This
charge is,
of
course,
the one with which Pentecostals have been
perennially
saddled. And from the looks of things, it is something that we will need to continue to battle
against, especially
if we
proceed to de-emphasize
systematic theological
reflection in favor of more nar- rative forms of theological articulation. This direction is one of the few remaining
for
theology
if the deconstructivist
critique
is not
tempered. Johns herself does not
say
in so
many
words that this is the
case,
but
14See his massive Paul the Apostle: The Triumph of God in Life and Thought, 2nd ed.
(Philadelphia,
PA: Fortress Press, 1984), and his The Triumph of God: The Essence of Paul s Thought (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1990), which is more accessible to those who are not biblical scholars.
lS?s is formulated most
clearly by Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1992); I am grateful to Mark Cartledge for reminding me of this contribution of Thiselton’s in a recent conversation.
.
6
91
she is also silent about what she envisions
theology
will or should be. Be that as it may, theologians need to think this issue
through
for them- selves in conjunction with the
larger
academic and ecclesial communi- ty.
The
point
is that if the centers of metanarratives are
giving way
to multiple
centers anchored in
multiple
narratives,
what does that do for systematic theology?
More
important,
what does that do for our under- standing
of truth?
Before I
proceed,
I need to
register my agreement
with Johns’ description
of the
present
situation: “All
knowledge
is now viewed as being historically conditioned,
and there is the
abiding suspicion regarding any
claim to truth.”16 Yet I am a theologian. Truth is ulti- mately
what I am concerned about. The view that all knowledge is his- torically
conditioned does not translate into the view that truth is no longer
determinable. Part of the task of
systematic theology,
I would argue,
is to
supply
the reflection
necessary
for a coherent understand- ing
of our
experience
of
God, ourselves,
and the world which in turn allows us to test our
understanding
of this
experience against reality, and to guide our conduct. The
difficulty
confronted
by
narrative forms of
theologizing
has been that of
bridging
the
gap
between
meaning located within
specific
contexts and narratives and truth as
public.17 The Pentecostal
experience
favors
theology
as
testimony.
But if truth goes only
so far its
meaningfulness
can
convey it,
and if
meaning
is limited
contextually
to the internal cohesion of narrative forms and structures,
how can
personal testimony convey
truth that transcends its framework of meaning? Troeltsch’s
theological question
from the turn of the
century
remains with us: How can a semi-metanarrative nurtured in the heart of
European
life and culture be
meaningful
and have absolute
implications
for non-Western cultures? What is
good, right, and true for the Christian
may
not be so for the
Buddhist, or the Hindu. At the more concrete and existential
level,
the result is that what is good
for me
may
not
necessarily
be
good
for someone else. Is it the case that the
postmodernist critique
is really an extended radicalization of modernity’s turn to the
subject?
The
systematic theologian
within me shrinks from
drawing such
conversation-terminating
conclusions.
My
two
premises
are that the Bible is not
just
another
narrative,
but is a metanarrative, and that its truths are
public
and therefore
potentially
universalizable.18
By
l6Johns, “Partners in Scandal,” 8.
l?Many
of the essayists in Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. Ockholm, eds., The Nature
of Confession: Evangelicals
and Postliberals in Conversation (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1996),
with just this task.
1 gMy
reference to the Bible as a metanarrative struggle
by no means implies that it is story- like in its entirety, but rather highlights my conviction that the diverse genres of Scripture
communicate a message by which everything else is judged.
7
92
potentially,
I am
referring simply
to the
possibility
actualized time and time
again
that biblical truths are also
potentially ideologizable.
On the one
hand,
we must therefore
guard against interpretations
of Jesus which are untruthful. On the other
hand,
I need to insist as a Christian theologian
to
my
Buddhist,
Hindu and secular friends that Jesus Christ is the universal savior, not
only
of those
suffering
under the
bondage
of sin,
but also of those
suffering
under the
bondages
of desire, illusion or ignorance
and
technological
lack. But mere verbal insistence is noth- ing
without
rigorous argumentation:
hence the
importance
of
system- ization. I would
argue,
therefore, that it is precisely the task of the
sys- tematician to watch out for
ideological
and even
religious distortions, and that it is this
discipline
which is best
equipped
to do so because of its
comprehensive range. Systematic theology pays
attention to the master narrative of
Scripture
and to the broadest
scope
of human
expe- rience,
and
thereby
aims for the
objective
of
formulating
a holistic understanding
of our
experience
of God, self and world.
In this
light,
while I think Smith is
right
in some
ways
to view theology
as one theoretical
discipline among
others,
I see its
scope
to be
potentially
far more
comprehensive.
I would
agree
with Smith in saying
that Pentecostal
experience
includes at least a pretheoretical ele- ment. But because this is the case, it is
absolutely mandatory
that we attempt
to
give expression
to our
experience
in order to prevent it from being vacuous,
and that we do so
by coming
at it again and
again
from different
vantage points.
The
emerging
Pentecostal
experience
and mind needs to be
continuously
checked
against Scripture
as well as Scripture-informed experience.
As
important,
with Smith and more specifically
with Johns, I agree that “our
scholarship
can
only
be mutu- ally
enriched
by
continued
dialogue
and
sharing.”19
I would therefore demand that
interpretive
narratives from Pentecostals around the world,
and from other Christian
communities-including
academic ones-be internalized as an intrinsic
part
of this
process
of
systematic theologizing.
Love’s
knowledge,
Johns is well
aware,
is not
only impoverished
if
sought only
within a bi-level conversation between Pentecostals and
Wesleyans,
but its
implications
are also not limited to the circles of minds scandalized
by
Noll. In this
sense,
I
agree
with both Smith’s and Johns’
rejection
of Noll’s
suggestion
that the renewed evangelical
mind serve as the foundational narrative. There is indeed a paradigm
change,
but it is one which relativizes all paradigms, that of the
evangelical
renaissance and our own Pentecostal one included. The experience
of our
global
Pentecostal
community,
and those of others outside our immediate circle?harismatics and others even far beyond-must
be
given
at least
equal
consideration. For us to remain
l9Johns, “Partners in Scandal,” 22.
,
8
93
within the boundaries of our own
parochialism
would be to
give
into the
subjectivism
that Noll blames for the
neglect
of the mind.2o
The
quest
for truth, however, is central at least to theologians in this
ongoing
conversation if not for others as well.
Systematic
theolo- gy
is therefore best understood as a reflective
enterprise
that encom- passes
the three horizons of God, self, and world and
attempts
to com- prehend
their
relationships,
and that
gets accurately
at the realities that they
claim to
engage.
This
theological enterprise
is now accountable to diverse narratives that need to be correlated in its search for norms, its quest for truth, and in its effort to articulate our
experience
and
syn- thesize it within a coherent framework of belief and
understanding. Systematic theology
is thus the truthful
integration
of Pentecostal
faith, spirituality, praxis,
and
thought-making
coherent its
plausibility structures, ensuring
that its
understanding corresponds
to the
way things are,
and
giving guidance
to Pentecostal life. It is Pentecostal to the extent that it listens to and
incorporates
the narratives and “bab- blings”
of the
marginalized.
It is Christian to the extent that it listens prayerfully
to the Word of God and to those in the Christian tradition who have
faithfully preceded
us. It is truthful to the extent that it inter- prets
the realities of God, self, and
world-including,
as Smith
sug- gests,
the
insights gained
from all other theoretical
(and empirical,
I would
add) disciplines-more accurately
than other efforts.
In these
senses,
I trust that there remains
plenty
of room for
sys- tematic
theology,
and that its future is not as bleak as its detractors
por- tray.
A
complete
defense of
systematic theology
as an
integral
and even
necessary discipline
would need to
explore
the
development
of theology prior
to the
Enlightenment-in
the
age
of the Church Fathers and that of the medieval scholastics. That a task, however, I will need to reserve for another time.
My plea
at this juncture in this scandalous conversation is that we resist the dualisms inherent in a discourse that pushes
too far the distinctions between faith and
theory,
between heart and mind, between
“letting go
and
letting
God” and
“working [and thinking]
out our salvation with fear and
trembling,”
between
speaking in
tongues
and the
interpretation
of
tongues.
No doubt
my
own
sug- gestions may
be dismissed as the last
gasps
of a theologian losing his grip
on
totality.
Alas the
plight
of the
systematician.21
2()To be fair to Noll, he does acknowledge and indeed argues that the liberation of the evangelical mind from fundamentalism has been accelerated when evangelicals have engaged with and learned from non-evangelicals.
2lM?y
thanks to Frank Macchia for his comments on an earlier draft of this response.
I am also grateful for the questions and remarks of students at Bethany College,
Scotts Valley, California, before whom the main points of this paper were originally presented
in a lecture on 7 May 1998.
9
10
